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This work develops a portfolio model of the banking ﬁrm where both the size
and composition of the portfolio are jointly determined. The model provides a quite
simplemicro-foundationofthecreditchannelofthetransmissionofmonetarypolicy.
It allows analysing the pricing policies of the banking ﬁrm, and shows how interest
rate shocks and credit quality shocks (the real shocks that change expected default
costs) affect the equilibrium level of loans and deposits.
1 Introduction
The aim of this work is to analyse the behaviour of banking intermediaries as interest
rate shocks and credit quality shocks affect the economy. In particular we want to study
how the equilibrium level of loans and deposits changes, and how the pricing policies of
banks are affected, by different types of shocks.
To address these problems we have chosen to build up a general portfolio model,
based on the assumption that the banking ﬁrm is risk-neutral. Standard portfolio mod-
els, explicitly or implicitly, superimpose a concave utility function on the proﬁt function
of the bank, so that the second moment of the probability distribution of the underlying
independent variables matter. The problem with this approach is that the concavity of
the function is assumed rather than properly justiﬁed, and this assumption contrasts with
standard microeconomic practice. This kind of assumption has been justiﬁed on the basis
of the existence of non-linear bankruptcy costs, which inﬂuence the decision process of
managers, delegated agents of the shareholders. This approach is problematic, though.
Firstly, it is not general, since it could not describe the behaviour of private ﬁrms. Sec-
ondly, bankruptcy costs cannot be strictly convex, as the approach would require: when
managers’ private information makes them believe that the value of assets is lower than
1value of liabilities, they have an incentive to bear any risk, since they have nothing to
loose. Besides this analysis does not take into account another very important factor that
works in the opposite direction. When the value of the ﬁrm is divided between equity and
debt, it can be shown that debt is a concave function, while equity is a convex function, of
the value of the underlying investment projects.1 The risk attitude of banks, which have
peculiar liabilities and assets, and of industrial ﬁrms, must be completely different. For
this reason it is necessary to rely on properly micro-founded models, where the nature of
all relevant revenue and cost factors is properly speciﬁed. In other words, the risk attitude
of the ﬁrm cannot be assumed a priori, it must be an endogenous outcome of the model.
Banks provide jointly two different sets of services: payment services and ﬁnancial in-
termediation. In principle the banking ﬁrm should be treated as a multi-product ﬁrm, sep-
arating the interest rate margins that constitute revenues from the intermediation services
from the fees generated by the payment services. Despite that, the almost entire analysis
of the banking industry has focused almost exclusively on ﬁnancial intermediation. The
study of the payment industry is in fact quite straightforward as long as transaction costs
are kept out of the picture, since, as Fama has shown,2 general equilibrium analysis can be
applied in a quite standard fashion. Most of the peculiarities of the industry seem accord-
ingly to depend on the peculiar structure of assets and liabilities of banks, which depend
on the intermediation services that banks provide.3 As compared to other industries, the
standard treatment of banking ﬁrms results in a more detailed treatment of some aspects
of the industry, including notably the relationship between deposits and other assets, loans
in particular. As a counterpart there is a great deal of simpliﬁcation in other regards. The
cost functions are simple, and there is no technical progress. This has permitted to study
the effect of transaction costs modifying the basic framework.4
In this work we emphasize the role of payment services, introducing industrial cost
functions which reﬂect some of the main features of the industry. We show that in pres-
ence of imperfect information, the focus on the joint provision of ﬁnancial intermediation
and payment services produces a richer, dynamic, framework. Transaction costs (search
costs in particular, which are empirically signiﬁcant in both the market for loans and the
market for deposits5), produce in fact two important consequences: they cause path de-
pendence in the demand functions and they generate market power.6 We show that in this
1See Merton [24] and Flannery [15].
2See Fama [13].
3Sealey and Lindley have reconciled the literature on banking intermediation with the traditional theory
of the ﬁrm, showing that deposits have to be considered an intermediate product that enters as an input in
the production function of the ﬁnal product: loans facilities. See Sealey and Lindley [23]
4For example, because of the relevance of search costs, deposits have been modelled as a quasi-ﬁxed
input.
5See for the market of the US the empirical analysis of Flannery [14] and Hess [19] and [20].
6See Salop [29] and Salop and Stiglitz [30] and [31]. Beside, a vast literature has shown that banks
2situation, any non-linear cost function generates implicit adjustment costs. Thus we have
a dynamic problem even without explicitly postulating ad hoc adjustment costs for the
stock of deposits or loans.
We specify just one, very simple, non-linearity: a stochastic default cost function.
Such a cost function captures a fundamental aspect of the banking activity, the ability of
banks to ﬁnance opaque investment projects whose risk the market cannot price. We still
rely on the standard simpliﬁcations, such as constant technology and constant returns to
scale in the payment services provision.
A crucial assumption of the model is that the quantity of loans issued affects the be-
haviour over time of the demand for deposits. This kind of relationship is implicitly
assumed in macroeconomic monetary models, whenever concepts such as inside money
or endogenous money creation are used.7 We provide a simple micro-foundation of such
a process, based on the assumption that banks compel borrowers to deposits a fraction
of every loan issued.8 This process allows the banker to choose optimally the amount of
loans issued in order to obtain the optimal size of the portfolio. Loans are an “invest-
ment” that generates deposits. We assume that the asset portfolio of the bank is composed
of loans and bonds. The equilibrium composition of the portfolio and the size of the
portfolio are thus jointly determined, in contrast to the traditional assumption of portfolio
separation.9 We obtain a very simple solution for the value of the roots, and it is possible
to analyse both the dynamic properties of the system and the equilibrium composition of
the portfolio.
Another important peculiarity of this work is that all variables are deﬁned in real
terms, which contrasts with the standard practice of the literature on banking, even if
it is more in line with the standard assumptions of the theory of the ﬁrm. The need
to deﬁne the variables in real terms comes from the dynamic properties of the model.
Deﬁning the portfolio in real terms makes it possible to have real variables that have stable
growth ratios even when the nominal variables diverge. This approach is particularly
valuable since the evolution of the ﬁnancial systems over the last decades has seen a
continuousgrowthofthesizeofbankingintermediarieswhilethebankingindustry’sshare
of the ﬁnancial intermediation has declined. In general, the treatment of the ﬁnancial
sector in real terms suggests the neutrality of money, and it poses the question of price
level determinacy. However we ﬁnesse both issues here by introducing the price level
beneﬁt from monopoly power in both the market for deposits and the market for loans.
7The peculiar institutional framework of contemporary banks, based on the joint provision of depository
and lending services, can be explained viewing the bank as an institution specialized in the provision of
liquidity on demand to both households and ﬁrms. See Diamond and Rajan [10].
8Aswewillshowtheavailableempiricalevidenceonﬁrms’demandformoneysupportsthisassumption.
9Elyasiani, Kopecky and Van Hoose [11] have shown that the hypothesis of portfolio separation in the
case of banking intermediaries is not empirically supported.
3as an exogenous process. This permits moving directly from real to nominal variables.
Therefore this analysis of the banking ﬁrm does not imply money neutrality (since the
exogenous price level process can affect real bank behaviour) and does not imply price
level indeterminacy.
Finally, monetary policy choices are not explicitly introduced in the analysis, even if
discount window borrowing would be possible to study readily. Besides, the construction
of a general equilibrium model of the market for payment services is beyond the scope
of this work and we simply assume the existence of substitution between currency and
deposits. We do not explicitly introduce the market for currency, relying on a reduced
form equation that describes the demand for deposits as a function of the main relevant
variables. An example of a simple micro-foundation of our assumptions in a general
equilibrium framework can be found in Freeman and Kydland [16].
Three important limitations of the model must be spelled out. We assume price and
cost ﬂexibility and neutrality, so that inﬂation has no direct effect on costs and revenues.
The only market imperfections we consider are linked to limited information. This limited
information is the underlying source of both market power and the peculiar structure of
the cost functions in the model. Secondly, we choose not to deal with liquidity problems,
on the assumption that they are adequately managed through compulsory reserve require-
ment and deposit insurance. Liquidity costs could easily be introduced in the model, but
they would complicate the results without increasing the understanding of the problems
that we want to study. Finally, we largely disregard the inﬂuence of net worth, and we in-
troduce no markets in bank equity in the analysis. We discuss this limitation of the model
to some extent, although in quite general terms. This limitation is almost standard in mi-
croeconomic theory of banking. It is so even though the role of banking intermediaries
usually rests on limited availability of information, as here, and when information is not
perfect the Modigliani-Miller theorem does not hold. Consequently, the composition of
the liabilities of the ﬁrm matters and equity markets can have a role. This reinforces the
fact that, while standard, our disregard of equity markets is a limitation of our work.
2 The environment
2.1 The banking ﬁrm
The model is in discrete time, and has the following time structure. At the beginning
of every period, households and ﬁrms dispose of a certain amount of funds from previous
periods. Households take decisions regarding their portfolio allocation and their con-
sumption plans for the period. Firms plan their investments for the period and determine
4their ﬁnance needs. Deposits serve in order to carry out transactions and as a ﬁnancial
investment. At the end of every period households and ﬁrms dispose of an amount of
funds that reﬂects the evolution of the value of their assets, the income of the period and
their consumption choices. Firms assure themselves the liquidity they require to carry out
their transactions by resorting to loans. The feedback process of loans on deposits that
we describe can be understood as resulting from the provision of liquidity to ﬁrms: at the
end of the period households receive part of the liquidity generated trough loans. This as-
sumption ﬁts well with Ramey’s [28] ﬁndings of cointegration between M1 and business
M1.
The bank can invest its deposits in two types of assets: loans and bonds. Besides the
bank must hold a fraction of its deposits as reserves (that could possibly provide a return).
2.1.1 Cost functions
The analysis of the problem of the banking ﬁrm in its most general form is impossible
without specifying a simpliﬁed cost structure. A frequent solution is to suppose separa-
bility of the cost structure in terms of the three major components of the portfolio: bonds,














This is a simpliﬁcation we will follow.10
We choose to describe the cost of servicing deposits and loans as a linear function
of the quantity. The cost of check clearing and other desk operations is in fact linked to
the number of transactions made by the customers, but for simplicity we can assume that
the cost is proportional to the amount of deposits and loans,11 since there are no obvious
reasons for it to be convex. In fact, the cost might be concave, because of an element of
ﬁxed costs. But within the context of an inﬁnite horizon problem without entry or exit,
ﬁxed costs can be neglected. Besides, the large empirical literature regarding the existence
of scale economies in the banking system has not led to undisputed conclusions.12 The
10Thisformulationsupports theexistenceofa separateproductionfunctionfor each classofassets andfor
deposits. The simpliﬁcation is not a big problem as long as the eventual economies of scope between assets
and liabilities or among assets are not crucial for the problem studied. The available empirical evidence
on the relevance of economies of scope among different components of the portfolio has not produced any
conclusive result, and is quite controversial. This is not surprising, though, because complementarities and
economies of scope do not arise between the provision of deposit services and loans, as normally assumed.
They arise between the two separate economic functions that banks fulﬁl: the provision of payment services
and ﬁnancial intermediation. Consequently, the empirical analysis is complex, because revenues and cost
of one service are often confused with revenues or costs of the other and vice versa.
11A detailed study of the industrial costs of deposit is provided by Osborne [27], and our assumptions are
compatible with it.
12The most recent empirical evidence regarding the return to scale of banks is in Weelock and Wilson
5fact that banks of widely different size survive in almost every country would indicate that












2 = 0. (1)
We can express the relevant cost functions simply as:
C(Dt) = uDt C(Lt) = zLt, (2)
where u and z are positive real numbers.
The assumptions regarding the structure of costs linked with the provision of ﬁnancial
intermediation services are crucial. Banks normally face two principal kinds of costs:
default costs and liquidity costs both stochastic. They are in fact essentially due to the
uncertaintyresultingformshocksthatmayhitborrowersordepositors. Theformershocks
might lead to defaults by borrowers, the latter may cause a bank run. We will focus on
default costs.
One of the most relevant functions of banks is to evaluate uncertain investments,
whose risk the market cannot price because it lacks the information necessary to attribute
a probability distribution to the outcome of the investment. To undertake this activity
banks must invest resources to obtain and process the relevant information. We assume
that the returns of the investment in information are decreasing, since the available stock
of knowledge represents a binding constraint.13 Besides we assume that the outcome of
this investment is uncertain, since it may depend on factors whose uncertainty is radical.14













2 < 0, (4)
[40]. They showed that after 1985 there is evidence of increasing returns to scale for small and medium size
banks, while the restriction of constant returns to scale could not be rejected for large banks. The ﬁnding of
relevant return to scale is probably due to the progressive deregulation of the banking sector.
13This implies that banks cannot increase direct lending at will without reducing the efﬁciency of their
monitoring and screening processes. Increasing direct lending indeﬁnitely would mean that sooner or later
they would ﬁnance investment projects of decreasing quality.
14TheconceptofradicaluncertaintyhasbeenlargelyusedbyKeynesandShackletodescribetheoutcome
of processes that the existing knowledge does not allow to forecast with a reasonable degree of accuracy.
One of Keynes’ examples is the price of copper in ﬁfty years time.
6and with
v = vd +ed with E[ed] = 0 E[e2
d] = s2
d. (5)
We assume the cost functions to be constant over time, in order to obtain a closed-form
solution. Under the assumption of rational expectations, cost functions are homogeneous
of degree one with respect to inﬂation; both marginal costs coefﬁcients and interest rates
are proportionally shifted by variations of the price level. The same cost functions can
be used to describe the problem of the bank when the relevant variables are deﬁned in
nominal terms, or when they are deﬁned in real terms, as a ratio over the price level.
Finally, we assume that the market for bonds is efﬁcient and competitive. This im-
plies that expected default costs on bonds are a linear function of the quantity purchased.
Consequently we do not need to introduce explicitly an expected default cost function for
bonds, assuming that the relevant interest rates on bonds are net of default costs.15
2.1.2 Revenues
The main stream of proﬁts of the bank stems from the difference between the interest
rate rLt, that the bank charges on loans, and the interest rate rDt, that it pays to depositors.
As mentioned, for simplicity we assume that banks do not buy shares, and that the only
available alternative to the issue of loans is the purchase of bonds. The alternative source
of revenues is given by the spread between the interest rate on bonds rBt and the rate on
deposits.
We assume that the rate on bonds is set exogenously, and that the bank is price taker
in the market for bonds. Since banks normally hold reserves in the form of cash, or non-
interest-bearing deposits at the central bank, reserves do not provide a return, and reserve
requirements are for the bank equivalent to a tax on deposits.
We assume that expectations are rational and ﬁnancial markets are efﬁcient. Conse-
quently, expected inﬂation is always fully incorporated in all market interest rates, and we
can consider all interest rates to be real interest rates.
2.1.3 The budget constraint







15The introduction of non-linear default cost for bonds would complicate the analysis without changing
the results in a relevant way.
7where the upper index indicates that the variables are in nominal terms. The value of FN
t
represents the amount of assets that are invested on assets, such as bonds. The value of
LN
t represents the amount of loans issued by the bank. NWN
t is the net worth of the bank,
and we assume that it remains constant over time: NWN
t+1 = NWN
t = NWN. Because of
a monopolistic framework, proﬁts are not pushed down to the normal rate. In addition,
we assume that there is a one hundred per cent dividend payout, so that all proﬁts are
distributed to shareholders in every period. We then deﬁne the variables in real terms, as
ratios with respect to the price level, and real deposits become Dt =
DN
t




Pt , and analogously for the other variables. Thus we obtain:
Lt +Ft +Rt = Dt +NW, (7)
The bank can buy securities or invest in loans only the part of deposits that it does not keep
as reserve. Deﬁning with q the legal reserve coefﬁcient, so that Rt = qDt, the equation
becomes:
Lt +Ft = (1−q)Dt +NWt. (8)
2.2 The market for banking services
2.2.1 The demand for deposits
Households and ﬁrms demand deposits not just as a ﬁnancial asset for portfolio allo-
cation, but mainly because banks provide them with transaction services.16 The provision
of payment services implies the establishment of mutual trust between bank and depos-
itor. This generates substantial search costs for the depositors and transaction costs for
the bank, which implicitly furnishes a guarantee to the counterparts of the transactions
undertaken by its customers. Banks consequently charge depositors a ﬁxed cost for the
provision of deposit services, which makes even more expensive to hold multiple bank
16The market for payment services has always been highly competitive. Historically, commercial banks
needed to compete with note-issuing banks (prior to the arrival of state-owned central banks). In order
to get remunerated for the payment services that they provide (by means of checks, bookkeeping entries
and credit cards) banks charge fees on the transactions undertaken. On the contrary, transactions by means
of banknotes, whose technology is much simpler and cheaper, do not require the payment of fees. As a
consequence, commercial banks have to attract depositors offering an interest rate that banknotes do not pay.
The technological developments of the 20th century have reduced the competitive pressure from banknotes,
whose role has become smaller. But new competitors have come out. At the beginning of the twentieth
century savings institutions, which were developed initially exclusively to provide ﬁnancial intermediation
services, have been allowed to provide payment services by means of the gyro. Only later they have been
allowed to issue loans, becoming in all respect analogous to commercial banks. More recent technological
developments have allowed money market mutual funds and other ﬁnancial intermediaries to provide many
of the payment services that banks provide at a low cost. As a consequence the need to pay interest rates
has increased.
8accounts.
Firms may ﬁnd it proﬁtable to hold multiple accounts, but their choice of the optimal
allocation of their deposits among banks is a function of their need to pay for ﬁnance.
Since ﬁrms are normally net debtors, their main ﬁnancial problem is the minimization of
the cost of debt, and they normally hold deposits exclusively to the extent that it is neces-
sary in order to manage their commercial transactions. In practice though, banks compel
ﬁrms to deposit a fraction of the loans they issue. In the logic of simple intermediation
services this type of behaviour is apparently not very logical, since banks apparently give
with one hand and take back with the other. But it is perfectly consistent, taking into
account the provision of payment services. Banks compel borrowers to deposit the liq-
uidity that ﬁrms hold in order to manage their payments and to face any type of shocks
in order to manage the transactions of the borrowers, earning fees on the payment ser-
vices provided. An explanation of this kind was suggested by Sprenkle to explain the
actual amount of ﬁrms’ deposits, since it is impossible to justify the observed amount on
the basis of inventory theoretic models.17. This behaviour plays a fundamental role in
banking intermediation, and generates the economies of scope between the two different
types of services, ﬁnancial intermediations and payment services. By means of this kind
of implicit contractual agreements, bankers can monitor the liquidity of the borrowers in
real time, obtaining the fundamental stream of information that allows them to evaluate
and price the risk of the ﬁrms’ investment projects. This simple link between the amount
of loans issued and the amount of ﬁrms’ deposits allows a simple formalization of the
process of liquidity creation, due to the convertibility of deposits on demand.
We can conclude that because of the relevance of search costs in the provision of
transaction services, depositors do not easily switch from one bank to another when fees
and interest rates are marginally changed. Flannery [14] and Hess [20] have conclusively
shown the empirical relevance of transaction costs (search costs in particular) in the mar-
ket for deposits. Deposits are, in fact, increasingly described as quasi-ﬁxed inputs. Since
search costs allow the banking ﬁrm to charge non-competitive prices,18 we assume that
monopolistic competition is the normal market structure.19
Banks need to pay an interest rate on deposits because of the competition of interme-
diaries other from normal commercial banks, such as money market mutual funds. These
inter-industry competitors can in fact offer interest rates not too far from those on bonds.
As a consequence we will assume ultimately that each bank has some monopoly power
on the price of deposits, while market interest rate on bonds affect negatively the demand
17See Sprenkle [35] and [36].
18See Salop [29] and Salop and Stiglitz [30] and [31].
19The existence of intra-industry monopoly power in the banking industry of the US has been empirically
conﬁrmed by Cosimano and Mc Donald [8].
9for deposits.
In order to obtain a demand schedule for deposits services, we decompose the demand
of households and ﬁrms. The demand of both classes of agents is assumed to depend on
twodifferentinterestrates, theownrateondepositsandtherateonbonds, thatisanoppor-
tunity cost. For simplicity, we assume that transaction fees do not affect the demand for
deposits. This can be justiﬁed considering interest rates on deposits to be net of transac-
tion fees, which is acceptable as long as the average amount of transactions conducted for
a given sum deposited is constant. Having ruled out the inﬂuence of technology shocks,
this simpliﬁcation should be acceptable.
Following the usual assumption, we model agents’ transaction demand for deposit
services as a function of income. We assume that real output is an AR(1) process:
Yt+1 = gYYt +eY
t+1 =Yt +gYYt +eY
t+1. (9)
We also assume that the general price level is another AR(1) process, deﬁned as
Pt+1 = gPPt +eP
t+1 = Pt +PPt +eP
t+1. (10)
Nominal household’s deposits depend (positively) on the level of nominal income,20 the
own interest rate on deposits and (negatively) on the interest rate on bonds. But the house-
hold income demand for nominal deposits is less than unitarily elastic:
IDN
t = (YtPt)1/h, h > 1 . (11)
As a result of the behaviour over time of income and prices, in the next period,
Et[IDN
t+1] = Et[(gYYt +eY
t+1)(gPPt +eP
t+1)]1/h. (12)
For simplicity, we assume that the correlation between the two error terms is zero.
Et[IDN





























To the income component of the demand for deposits, we must add the interest rate com-
ponent:
Dh
t = IDt + f2rD
t − f3rB
t . (17)
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B i = j, E[eB
t+ieB
t+j] = 0 i 6= j.
Banks ultimately set interest rates on deposits as a function of the rate on bonds. Conse-
quently the rate on deposits becomes a linear combinations of the rate on bonds and some
non stochastic parameters. So they can be assumed to follow a different random walk
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Consequently,
E[Dh








I assume that ﬁrm’s real deposits depend on both rates as before, and on the quantity
of real loans issued by the bank. We assume that deposits depend on the amount of loans
of the current period.21
D
f
t = kLt + f4rD
t − f5rB
t . (22)
The coefﬁcient k captures the effect of the feedback of loans on deposits. For simplicity
loans are assumed to affect deposits for the following period only.22 We make the further
21Alternatively the dependence can be assumed to be lagged, and deposits of the current period depend
on loans of the previous one. It can be shown that the results do not change in a relevant way.
22This assumption is necessary in order to make the model tractable. But it can be justiﬁed considering
that the lag in the operation of the feedback should not be too long: ﬁrms keep part of their loans as deposits,
and in general most of the portfolio of retail banks is made up of short-term loans.
11assumption that:
(1−q)k > 1−d. (23)
This assumption guarantees that issuing loans will raise deposits because of sufﬁcient
inertia in the exogenous component of the demand for deposits. The assumption is not
very restrictive since 1−d is always very small, as can be easily veriﬁed, and the value of
q is also small, unless the reserve coefﬁcient is enormous.23 24
Summing deposits of ﬁrms and households we can obtain the expected level of de-
posits of the bank as:
E[Dt+1] = dDt +g3E[rD
t+1]−g4E[rB
t+1]+kE[Lt+1] (24)
where g3 = [f4+(1−d)f2] and g4 = [f5+(1−d)f3].
With our formulation, interest rates on bonds and deposits affect equilibrium levels, rather
than the dynamic behaviour of deposits. In the long run in fact the former should depend
on the productivity of capital and the average time-preference coefﬁcient, while the lat-
ter should be different only for the marginal costs of banking services. These factors are
unlikely to follow a trend, either deterministic or stochastic. This is reﬂected in our as-
sumption of a unit root in the stochastic process. Indeed, the interest rate is increasingly
modelled as a mean-reverting stochastic process, such as the Uhlenberg-Ulbeck one in
continuous time.
In conclusion, the demand for deposits services has three components. One compo-
nent is completely exogenous and cannot be inﬂuenced by the bank in any way. It depends
on the behaviour of income and prices. The second depends on the portfolio choices of
the bank, and results from the fact that a ﬁxed proportion of loans feeds back into deposits.
The third component is the interest rate on deposits.
2.2.2 The demand for loans
The costliness of information generates monopoly power in the market for loans. Re-
lationship lending in fact allows the bank to price monopolistically, and the higher return
due to the market power makes the higher risks of the project worthwhile.25 All the avail-
23In countries like the UK its value is zero.
24When this condition is not satisﬁed, monetary authorities never need to worry about the inﬂuence of
the issue of loans on part of banks. With narrow banking this would be the case, the condition would in fact
become d > 1, and it would never hold.
25Sharpe [34] has shown that establishing long-term relationships with its customers, a bank learns more
than others about the business and the capability of the borrower. This information asymmetry generates a
rent that allows banks to ﬁnance risky projects whose information is very opaque, which cannot be ﬁnanced
12able empirical evidence conﬁrms that the direct lending activity of the banking industry is
scarcely competitive.26 Consequently we introduce in the problem of the bank a demand
curve for loans, which the banks estimates.









The ﬁrm maximizes its expected proﬁts over an inﬁnite horizon period. The problem





















Lt +Ft +Rt = Dt +NW, (27)




Dt = dDt−1+kLt +g3rD
t −g4rB
t . (30)
in the market. Establishing the relationship and developing their knowledge, banks provide a valuable
service, they create the knowledge necessary to price the risk. The price that ﬁrms pay for this service is the
monopolistic rent that they pay on loans.
26The empirical tests for the presence of market power were traditionally performed studying the be-
haviour of the rate on loans, which has been found to be stickier than the rate on bonds, in different estimates
conducted in different periods of time and different countries. This evidence though was not conclusive,
since the stickiness of the rate can be explained as well as the outcome of credit rationing, or the result of
implicit contracts for the smoothing of interest rate shocks. An important recent result has been provided by
Cosimano and Mc Donald [8], who, studying the effect of a change in reserve requirements on bank proﬁts,
have conclusively proved that banks in the US exploit signiﬁcant market power in the market for loans.
27For an analysis of the factors that affect the intercept term of a linear demand curve for loans, see
Bertoni Mazzoleni and Sz¨ ego [4].
13The logical structure of the proﬁt function is very simple: revenues come from the interest
rate spreads, the costs that must be deducted are the cost functions, as previously deﬁned.
The discount factor is bt = 1
(1+r)t, where r, is the banker’s discount rate. I assume that the
correlation among all error terms are zero, except for the positive correlations between
respectively, the default cost and the interest rate on bonds, and between the demand for
loans and the interest rate on bond. Deposits are the state variable of the problem, while
Ft, the amount of bonds held in the portfolio, is the control variable of the bank.
3.1.1 Monopolistic pricing and the dynamic constraint
Some features of the model are standard: the demand function for loans, in particular,
solves for the interest rate on loans, and its value is substituted in the proﬁt function. The
main peculiarity of the model lies in the deposit demand schedule, because its presence
makes stocks relevant, and the model becomes dynamic. To understand why, the equation














Substituting this function for Lt in the proﬁt function, we can observe that the quadratic
cost on loans works as a quadratic adjustment cost on deposits. The model thus becomes
formally identical to a standard dynamic one.28 But its structure is much simper than
that of other dynamic models of banking since we did not need to introduce ad hoc other
adjustment cost functions.29
In its dynamic properties the model is very close to an investment model. Deposits are
the state variable, and play the role of capital. The bank can increase the stock of deposits
issuing loans, so that the quantity of loans is akin to the level of investment. The only
differenceisthatwehavechosenthequantityofbondsheldintheportfolio, Ft, asacontrol
variable, so that loans are obtained residually. The model would be simpler adopting the
quantity of loans as a control variable, since the solution would then be reduced to a
ﬁrst order difference equation. But the choice of the quantity of bonds makes it possible
to obtain a simultaneous solution for both the optimal size and the optimal composition
of the portfolio. Thus, this alternative solution allows a much richer framework. Given
28It can be shown that a different speciﬁcation of the feedback process would produce identical results.
29Most dynamic models of banking, such as Elyasiani, Kopecky and Van Hoose [11] and Cosimano [6]
and [7], simply assume the presence of quadratic adjustment cost for deposits, loans or both.
14this preferable choice, the solution is composed of a system of two ﬁrst order difference
equations.30
3.1.2 Euler equation
After some manipulations (shown in the appendix), the following difference equation

























































Equation (34) together with the original dynamic constraint, given by the demand condi-
tion, (which we rewrite after substituting the budget constraint) form a system of differ-
30The model could easily (at lest in abstract) be modiﬁed to a Cournot model, without altering the main
results. The problem of every individual bank would in this case include the market share as an unknown of
the problem, and it would take into account the result of the same optimisation problem performed by the
others banks. We would now have n ﬁrms facing the respective n maximization problems, that include the
problems of the competitors in the price setting equation. And each individual ﬁrm’s problem would now
include as an unknown the value of the market shares y= L
Lj and c= D
Dj. The n equations would provide the
optimal supply functions. The condition of aggregation of the loan and deposits supply schedules provides



























The solution of this class of dynamic models is normally obtained as a function of the
roots of the system, which are in general quite complex. But because of the simplicity
of the structure of the model, there is a closed form solution for the eigenvalues of the




If one of the two roots is larger, while one is smaller than one, it is possible to solve
the model partially forward and partially backward, and obtain a saddle-path equilibrium.
This implies the existence of a unique convergent trajectory, on which the rational expec-
tations equilibrium lies. Necessary and sufﬁcient condition are:
(
d > 1 and bd > 1
d < 1 and bd < 1












Thus d < 1 implies gY < g
h−1
P . The income demand for deposits can grow at a faster rate
than prices, but it must not be of exponential order higher than h−1. This insures that the
demand converges to a ﬁnite value as the time horizon tends to inﬁnity. In the remainder
of the work we will assume that the condition d < 1 holds.
When this condition is satisﬁed, the condition regarding the other eigenvalue is satis-
ﬁed a fortiori, since b is a discount factor. Interestingly, it then follows that the dynamic of
system is not inﬂuenced either by the cost coefﬁcients, or by the feedback process (neither
would it be by reserve requirements). This is due the particularly simple structure of the
model, wherein costs on deposits are linear. But even in more complex models, with more
non-linear aspects, the stability of the system would depend fundamentally on the same
16two variables as here: the discount factor and the coefﬁcient of the lagged term in the
deposit demand condition (which, in turn, depends on the income demand for deposits).
In order to guarantee the stability of the system, a typical transversality condition must
also be satisﬁed. This additional transversality condition is in the appendix.
3.3 Rational Expectations Equilibrium
The Rational Expectations Equilibrium of the system follows through substitution.
Substituting Equation (34) in Equation (38), we obtain a second order difference equation


























































Using the expectation lag operator H, such that H−jEs−1xs = Es−1xs+j, the left hand side







Ft−1 = (1−l1H)(1−l2H)E[Ft+1]. (43)
Where l1 and l2 are the reciprocal of the roots of the system. The right hand side can be
rewritten as:








Thus, as stated earlier, the eigenvalues are:








































































We are assuming that l1 < 1 and l2 > 1. The right-hand side can be solved forward,
applying the algorithm developed by Sargent.31 Applying the transversality condition of
the problem (discussed in the Appendix), Equation (41) can be solved as:
































where c is an arbitrary constant. The application of the transversality condition implies
the imposition of a value of zero on the constant term c. Zero is in fact the only possible
value for the constant which makes the solution ﬁnite as t → ¥, since l2 = 1/bd > 1.32
3.4 Composition of the portfolio
Loans
The rational expectation equilibrium quantity of loans can be easily obtained from
the budget constraint L = (1−q)D−F +NW, after obtaining the equilibrium values of
31See Sargent [33] p. 176.
32See Sargent [33], p. 174 e p. 198.
18deposits and bonds.33 The value is:

























Since we have assumed that interest rates follow a random walk process, the correlation
between interest rates and default costs is time-invariant, and we can rewrite the expres-
sion in terms of the current and lagged values and the covariance as follows:




















+( ¯ A2+ ¯ A3L)rB
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The former expression has a simple interpretation. The equilibrium quantity of loans is a
function of its lagged value and of the expected future values of a set of variables. These
variables are: the quantity of net worth; the current and lagged values of interest rate on
bonds, interest rate return on required reserves, and interest rate on deposits; the coefﬁ-
cients of the industrial costs; the intercept of the demand for loans; and two terms that
describe the covariance between default costs and, respectively, interest rates on bonds
and the demand for loans. All of these factors have the expected sign, and their interpre-
tation is the same in most regards as it would be in a static monopolistic model. So the
equilibrium quantity is an increasing function of aggregate demand, as indicated by the
intercept of the demand curve, and a decreasing function of all cost terms. In the follow-
ing sections we will focus the discussion on the most relevant results, in particular those
concerning the impact of interest rates on bonds, the inertia in deposits demand and the
respective correlations between default costs and interest rates and default costs and de-
mand. We will say something about the neglected inﬂuence of the inﬂuence of net worth
in a separate section.
Consider ﬁrst the importance of market power in our dynamic framework. As noted





It is then easy to verify that the solution depends in a fundamental way on the coefﬁcient
b, which measures the interest rate sensitivity of the demand for loans and gives the slope
33We change the logical order for ease of exposition.
19of the demand curve. Examination of Equation (52) shows that most terms of the solution,
interest rates and costs in particular, are multiplied by 1/a, while the intercept of the de-
mand curve is multiplied by 1/ba. This makes a big difference since 1/a is an increasing
function of b, while 1/ba is a decreasing function of b. In fact, when the value of b is not
large, the main positive inﬂuence on the equilibrium is the intercept of the demand curve.
Otherwise (if the elasticity of the demand for loans is large), the main positive inﬂuence



















It follows that as competitive pressures increase, the relevance of the intercept of the de-
mand curve proportionally declines, and the issue of loans becomes dependent exclusively
on the margin between the interest rate spread and industrial costs.
The main result of this section thus far is that the equilibrium quantity of loans is an
increasing and concave function of the interest rate on bonds.
The effect of interest rates on bonds on the issue of loans depends on two different
factors: the interest rate sensitivity of the demand for loans, which is positive,34 and the
direct effect on banks, on the supply side of the market. The supply of loans is affected
by the rate on bonds in two different, contrasting, ways. The ﬁrst is a standard negative
portfolio composition effect (analogous to that in static analysis): the rate on bonds is
opportunity cost on loans. The second is a positive effect, which is due to the feedback
process linking the size of the portfolio to the issue of loans. Higher rates in fact increase
the return of both components of the assets portfolio, loans and bonds. This represents a
positive incentive for the issue of loans, which always dominates the negative opportunity-
costdirecteffect, basedonEquation(23).35 Thus, accordingtoourmodel, theequilibrium
quantity in the market for loans is an increasing function of the interest rates on bonds,
independently of the expected level of the default cost,36 and independently of the impact
of the interest rate on bonds on the demand for loans.
It must be emphasized, though, that this result does depend on the assumption that the
bank is able to issue bonds to ﬁnance the issue of loans. Quite speciﬁcally, we have not
imposed a positive value on the equilibrium level of bonds in the portfolio, F. In case
34this effect is ampliﬁed by the market power of the bank.
35It can in fact be seen that the ﬁrst of the three terms in the curled bracket that multiplies rB
t+j+1 is always
larger than one (which is the value of the second), thanks to our basic assumption of Equation (23).
36We do not need to consider the book value of the existing stock of bonds, which would be reduced
by the higher rate, because we are not considering the liquidity risk. In our framework the bank always
takes bonds to maturity, and since we have an inﬁnite horizon, and deposits are quasi-ﬁxed, the duration of
the liabilities is always longer than the duration of the assets. As a consequence, as Samuelson [32] had
originally shown, higher interest rates increase the proﬁts of the bank.
20of a negative equilibrium value, the bank issues rather than purchases bonds. If the bank
could not issue bonds, as it may be the case of small banks, the issue of loans might be
constrained by the availability of deposits. This could alter the model.
The covariance between the rate of interest and the reciprocal of the cost function,
COV(rB, 1
a), in turn, has a positive sign. Thus a positive correlation between the rate of
interestandthedefaultcosthasanegativeeffectontheissueofloans. Asaresult, ifhigher
rates on bonds are correlated with higher default costs on loans, the bank issues less loans.
Accordingly, the correlation reduces the impact of interest rate shocks. The same logic
holds in case of a positive correlation between the demand for loans and default costs, so
thatCOV(LD, 1
a) > 0. Not surprisingly, if a buoyant demand raises future default cost, the
bank issues a proportionate lower quantity of loans, and buys more bonds instead. The
correlation between default cost and the interest rate makes the equilibrium quantity of
loans a concave function of the interest rate.
The level of the contemporaneous and the twice lagged coefﬁcient of the rate on de-
posits ( ¯ C1 and ¯ C3 of Equation (52)) affects the issue of loans negatively, while the effect of
the lagged value is ambiguous (shown by the coefﬁcient ¯ C2), but normally positive. The
rate on deposits is in fact a cost that the bank has to face in order to issue loans and it re-
duces proportionally the proﬁtability of loans. As we would expect, industrial costs have
a negative impact too, and the inﬂuence of marginal cost of loans exceeds the inﬂuence of
the marginal cost of deposits.
An increase in the inertia of the demand for deposits (a larger d) increases the value
of the backward looking part of the equation and the positive inﬂuence of net worth.
Besides it increases the negative inﬂuence of the costs of deposits (the industrial cost and
the interest rate), since
¶Lt+j+1
¶d ¶u < 0. The impact on the interest rate coefﬁcient is more
complex, and it depends on the particular value of d. But for reasonable values of the





is negative.37 Besides we have shown that the inﬂuence of the value
of the interest rate coefﬁcient becomes dominant only when the market is competitive.





















Therefore, making some numerical examples, it can be shown that when the feedback coefﬁcient is not very
small (not much smaller than 0.1) inequality (54) holds exclusively when expected inﬂation is high (10%
or more), or the coefﬁcient h is large (i.e. when the income elasticity of deposits demand is low).
21Therefore we can conclude that a higher degree of inertia produces a reduced issue of
loans, at least when inﬂation is moderate. Since d is an increasing function of real income
expected growth, a higher expected trend of income growth apparently reduces the issue
of loans (in real terms). It must be added though that the demand for loans is strongly
correlated with income. Formally, the coefﬁcient a becomes a function of real income
a(Y), and since it normally plays a very relevant role, this correlation is likely to revert
the previous results. A moderate increase of expected inﬂation raises the issue of loans.
When trend inﬂation becomes very high though, the issue of real loans may actually
decline.
Finally, we can observe that loans are a decreasing and concave function of default
cost. It is important to observe that the impact of default costs, measured by the coefﬁcient
v, grows with the own interest rate sensitivity of the demand for loans, so that the stronger
the competitive pressure, the higher the inﬂuence of default costs.
3.4.1 Bonds
We have already obtained the general solution for the equilibrium quantity of bonds, in
Equation (50). Following the assumption that interest rates obey a random walk process,
the solution can be expressed as:





















































Since the structure of the solution is analogous to that of loans, the same kind of con-
sideration regarding the structure of the solution hold in this case, as for example for the




The sign of A1 is positive when the value of the interest rate sensitivity of the demand
for deposits, g4 is small, since the ﬁrst term of the expression is always positive.38 The
38The exact formulation of the other coefﬁcients is shown in the appendix.
22ﬁrst impact of the rate on bonds on the amount of bonds held in the portfolio is the re-
sult of a positive scale effect due to the fact that higher rates increase the return of the
portfolio. This implies that loans and bonds in the portfolio are complements, driving
the bank to purchase bonds when the issue of loans increases the amount of deposits. A
negative, contrasting effect is due to the negative dependence of the demand for deposits
on the rate on bonds, which represents the opportunity cost of holding deposits. Higher
rates, reducing the demand for deposits, tend to reduce the equilibrium level of deposits,
reducing accordingly the equilibrium level of the portfolio of assets different from loans.
Consequently the ﬁnal effect of an increase of the interest rate on the portfolio of bonds
cannot be established a priori.
The covariance between the rate of interest and the reciprocal of the cost function,
COV(rB, 1
a), has a positive sign. Thus any positive correlation between the rate of interest
and the default cost would have a negative effect on the purchase of bonds, reducing the
positive inﬂuence of the interest rate. The covariance between the demand for loans and
default costs COV(LD, 1
a) is positive. Therefore, any positive correlation between the
demand for loans and default costs implies a lower equilibrium holding of bonds.
The sign of the coefﬁcient A2 depends on the speciﬁc values of the coefﬁcients, so that
the lagged value of the rate on bonds may be either positive or negative. The twice-lagged
value of the rate is normally negative.
Industrial costs on both loans and deposits have a negative sign, since the proﬁt margin
becomes tighter as either increases, and the optimal size of the portfolio becomes smaller.
The impact of the interest rates on deposits is ambiguous. The rise in the cost to the
bank tends to reduce the optimal size of the portfolio of assets, but the increase in returns
to depositors augments the demand for deposits with a positive effect on the size of the
portfolio. The ﬁnal impact depends on the speciﬁc values of the coefﬁcients.
Default costs shrink the size of the forward-looking part of the equation, reducing the
portfolio of bonds. Default costs reduce the optimal quantity of loans and, as a conse-
quence, the size of the whole portfolio. We did not specify whether the bonds that the
bank buys were risk-free or high yield risky bonds. In the second case, assuming that de-
fault costsare alinear function ofthe quantitypurchased, these costswould proportionally
shrink the net returns of bonds.
233.4.2 Deposits

























































































The intertemporal equilibrium level of deposits depends negatively on the costs of both
deposits and loans. The level of deposits grows with the own interest rate, as a function of
the sensitivity of the demand for deposits. The lagged value of the own rate has a negative
impact.
Based on Equation (23), the sign of the equilibrium quantity of deposits as a function
of contemporaneous interest rate on bonds, can be positive or negative, depending on two
contrasting effects. The standard demand side effect is negative, since the rate on bonds is
the opportunity cost of deposits. But in this model, an opposite inﬂuence occurs from the
supply side of the market. Since the size of the portfolio depends on the issue on loans,
and proﬁts are an increasing function of interest rates on bonds, the interest rate has a
positive inﬂuence on the equilibrium level of deposits. The available evidence regarding
the demand for money would support the assumption that the demand effect dominates in
normal conditions. But in periods of high inﬂation the supply side effect may dominate.39
Besides, even in the case of deposits the market power plays an important role. The
relevance of the supply side effect is a function of the competitive structure of the market.
When the bank has a relevant market power it seems unlikely that the supply effect may
dominate the standard money-demand effect. But in a highly competitive environment
the inﬂuence of the supply-side is relevant, and the equilibrium quantity of deposits (and
of money aggregates where deposits are predominant, such as M1) is likely not to be very
sensitive to the interest rate on bonds. The sign of the lagged value of the rate depends on
39See Hoffman, Rasche and Tieslau [21].
24the speciﬁc values of the coefﬁcients, and it cannot be decided a priori, but its importance
is minor.
These results provide a theoretical rationale for the empirical evidence in Chari, Chris-
tiano and Eichenbaum [5], which shows that M1 has a positive correlation with future
values of the interest rate, while the correlation with contemporaneous and past values is
negative. Because of the assumption that future interest rates follow a random walk (and
accordingly the deterministic component is expected to remain constant), in our formula-
tion, the contemporaneous interest rate synthesises the effect of both future and contem-
poraneous rates. But it can easily be seen from the general solution 40 that the negative
demand side effect exclusively affects the contemporaneous value. On the contrary, be-
cause of the supply side, the equilibrium level of deposits is an increasing function of all
future expected values of the interest rate on bonds. 41
The covariance between the interest rate on bonds and the reciprocal of the default
costs reduces the effect of the interest rate, with a negative effect on the level of deposits.
Thus, the stronger the positive correlation between interest rates and default costs, the
smaller the equilibrium level of deposits. And the same happens for the covariance be-
tween the demand for loans and the reciprocal of the default cost.
Default costs shrink the size of the forward-looking part of the equation, reducing the
size of the portfolio. These costs are the true constraint on the size of the portfolio, putting
a limit to the liquidity creation. But the positive correlation between shocks in the demand





is positive, but, on the other hand, an increase of the inertia of
deposits demand increases the impact of the costs of deposits. As long as the feedback
coefﬁcient is not very small though, the positive effect always dominates.
3.5 The interest rate solutions
3.5.1 The interest rate on loans
The interest rate on loans can easily be obtained by substituting the solution (51) for
the quantity of loans in the demand condition. For simplicity, we use the solution of (52),
40Equation (60).
41Besides, it must be observed that contemporaneous and past values of the variables inﬂuence the lagged
value of the dependent variable too. In order to evaluate the inﬂuence of the lagged values of the rate it
would be necessary to solve the equation even in the backward direction. This can be seen from the general
solution in Equation (60).












































−( ¯ A2L+ ¯ A3L2)rB






























The value of the interest rate on loans depends fundamentally on the difference between
the value of the coefﬁcients of the intercept of the demand curve and the value of the
cost factors (industrial costs and interest rates on deposits). Any other factor is of a much
smaller order, including the interest rate on bonds in the case when the demand for loans
is elastic. As for the equilibrium quantity of loans, it can be seen that the main other factor
which affects the value of the rate on loans is the slope of the demand curve. As we would
expect, the rate is a decreasing function of b, the interest rate sensitivity of the demand for
loans.










































We assume that A is non-negative. When the demand for loans is not affected by the
market for bonds (d = 0), the sign of the derivative is always negative, because of the
fundamental assumption of the model, shown in Equation (23). In this situation though
the assumption that the bank can increase the liabilities issuing bonds is not acceptable,
because banks then would be the only ﬁrms with access to the bond market. As a con-
sequence, in this case we should introduce the non-negativity constraint, which would be
binding. In this situation the issue of loans would be severely constrained by the avail-
ability of deposits, and since higher rates on bonds normally reduce the equilibrium level
of deposits, the equilibrium level of loans could not be increased and the interest rate on
26loans could not decline.
In the general case, when the bank can freely issue bonds, the sign of the derivative is
positive if there is some substitution between bonds and loans in the demand of ﬁrms, so
that d is not irrelevant. The second term of the expression is in fact of a small magnitude,
and it is a decreasing function of the slope of the demand curve, b. As we would expect,
when the demand curve is ﬂat, shocks on the rate on bonds, which affect in particular
the supply of loans, produce a large impact on the quantity of loans and a small effect
on the interest rate. Since the supply curve is quite steep, shocks to the rate on bonds,
which shift the demand curve up produce an increase of the interest rate on loans. We can
conclude that in general the rate on loans is an increasing function of the rate on bonds.
This relationship is the stronger the higher the substitution between bonds and loans.
It seems reasonable to assume that the correlation between interest rates and default
costs becomes larger for higher values of the interest rates.42 This implies a negative
value for the derivative of the covariance, and, as a consequence, A < 1. It can be easily
seen that the correlation reduces the value of the right-hand side of the ﬁrst inequality.
Consequently, the correlation between interest rates and default costs drives the interest
rate on loans to move in the same direction as the interest rate on bonds, reducing the
inﬂuence of the supply-side of the market. Higher rates on bonds in fact imply a larger
issue of loans, and eventually lower rates on loans; but the positive correlation means that
higher interest rates are associated with higher default costs, and as a consequence this
negative effect on the interest rate is proportionally reduced. We can conclude that the




¶v > 0, while the second derivative is negative, the interest rate on loans
is an increasing, concave function of expected default costs. The equilibrium quantity
of loans is a decreasing, concave function of default costs: higher expected default costs
reduce the equilibrium quantity of loans, increasing the equilibrium interest rate.
The other variables of the model have an impact on the interest rate on loans which is
opposite than the effect on the quantity of loans. Because of the path dependence, caused
by the dynamics of the model, the lagged quantity of loans has a negative inﬂuence on
the rate. The once lagged coefﬁcient of the rate on bonds is normally negative, while the
secondlag hasa positiveinﬂuence. The contemporaneousand thetwicelagged coefﬁcient
oftherateondepositsaffectpositivelytherateonloans, whiletheeffectoftheoncelagged
42The correlation may be caused by two kinds of factors. It may be due to asymmetric information
problems that cause the pooling of borrowers (which in the extreme case cause a more than proportional
increase in defaults when interest rates rise, as the literature on credit rationing has emphasised), or it may
be due to the reduced value of the net worth of borrowers, which declines with the interest rate, increasing
the probability of default. In both cases the correlation is likely to be an increasing function of the interest
rate itself. This implies that the sensitivity of the rate on loans to variation of the interest rate on bonds must
be non-linear, it must be a concave function.
27value is ambiguous, but normally negative. Finally we can observe that the correlation
between the demand and the default costs tends to raise the rate on loans. The higher
covariance implies lower expected proﬁts, a reduced issue of loans, and higher interest
rates on loans.
3.5.2 The spread
















































depends on the factors that we have discussed in the previous section, and it is always
negative, since the own coefﬁcient b is always larger than the cross coefﬁcient d of the
demand curve, and the term in the ﬁnal bracket is negative. 43 The spread is always a
decreasing function of the interest rate on bonds, because the rate on bonds has a limited
impact on the rate on loans, even when loans and bonds are close substitutes for ﬁrms.
Finally, the spread is an increasing function of all the factors that enter in the term G
with a positive sign, which include the industrial costs of both loans and deposits and the
interest rates on deposits.
43Unless for the case of an extreme interest rate sensitivity of the correlation between the interest rate and




A permanent increase in the factor of growth of the economy raises the value of the








h > 0 (66)
We assume that the increase is not large enough for the value of d to be larger than one,
as in the rest of the analysis.
If income would not affect the demand for loans, the impact of variations of output
growth on the equilibrium quantity of loans would normally be negative, at least when
trend inﬂation is moderate. A lower inertia of deposits demand, in fact, allows the bank
to generate more deposits trough the issue of loans, increasing proﬁts. This would imply
that variations in the stock of loans are counter-cyclical. The demand for loans though is
strongly correlated with income. Since the expected value of future demand plays a key
role in the model, variations of the expected trend of income are fundamental, since they
permanently shift the demand curve. Persistent shocks, as those generated by productivity
shocks, generate a pro-cyclical response from the banking system. When the inﬂuence of
the demand for loans is fundamental for the problem of the bank, so whenever the bank
beneﬁts from relevant market power in the market for loans, the intermediation of the
banking system is strongly pro-cyclical, producing a ﬁnancial accelerator. This effect is
ampliﬁed by the cyclical nature of expected defaults.
4.1.2 Expected inﬂation
We have not explicitly described the market for means payment different form de-
posits, currency and other interest bearing means of payment, such as money market mu-
tual funds. Nevertheless our formulation of the demand for deposits implies some strong
assumptions regarding the substitution between different means of payment. In particular
the assumption of a positive, but less than unitary, nominal income elasticity of the de-
mand of deposits, implies that the demand for deposits in nominal terms is an increasing
but concave function of the price level. The substitution between deposits and currency,
whose demand is a declining function of the price level, explains the assumption that the
demand is increasing. Assuming that the demand is a concave function implies that the
demand for other interest bearing means of payments grows more with the price level than
29the demand of deposits.
Because of our long-run approach, we assume perfect ﬂexibility of all prices, so that
nominal costs and interest rates vary in the same proportion and real values are not af-













P < 0. (67)
In general the increase of expected inﬂation produces an increase of the issue of loans,
because higher expected inﬂation reduces the degree of inertia. The effect of an increase
of trend inﬂation on the issue of loans may become uncertain only when trend inﬂation
is very high. In the last case the impact of the variation of the price level may become
relatively larger than the increase of the level of the nominal variables, so that in real terms
the equilibrium value becomes lower.
4.2 Deviations from trend
4.2.1 A positive interest rate shock
The results obtained so far allow to understand the reaction of the banking industry to
market interest rate shocks. The fundamental conclusion that we have drawn in the former
section, with this regard, is that the issue of loans is an increasing concave function of the
interest rate on bonds, since bonds and loans are complementary assets in the portfolio
of the bank. Besides interest rates on loans are normally a positive but concave function
of the rate on bonds, while the spread between the rate on loans and the rate on bonds
is a decreasing function of the rate on bonds. We have obtained these results under the
assumption of risk neutrality for the bank; the non-linearity are due to the presence of a
convex default cost function in the proﬁt function. Since default costs are correlated with
the rate on bonds, proﬁts vary non-linearly with interest rates.
Since both the equilibrium quantity of loans and the interest rate on loans are increas-
ing but concave functions, the bank tends to smooth any transitory shock. The reason is
that changes in the stock of deposits, and consequently of loans, are costly. So any shock
which is expected to be reverted over a not too long horizon does not produce a variation
of the equilibrium quantity of loans, and consequently of the interest rate on loans. This
prediction of the model is line with the empirical evidence,44 and we reach the same con-
clusion of Fried and Howitt [17], namely that the bank has a strong incentive to provide
insurance against these shocks. According to Fried and Howitt though, banks smooth
interest rate shocks because insuring their customers they obtain higher average proﬁts,
44See Berlin and Mester [2].
30reducing the average default probability of borrowers. In our model, on the contrary, the
bank smoothes shocks even if average default costs are unchanged, because proﬁts are a
concave function of the interest rate, and a higher variance of the rate reduce proﬁts. And,
contrary to Fried and Howitt’s, these results would hold even in the case of a perfectly
competitive market for loans. They are particularly strong when the bank beneﬁts of rel-
evant market power: proﬁt margins, in fact, depend in this case largely on the level of
aggregate demand and to a minor degree only from the interest rate on bonds.
The model allows to study how the size and composition of the portfolio changes in
reaction to variations the market interest rates which are expected to be permanent. A
permanent interest rate shock pushes the bank to increase the size of the portfolio issuing
more loans, since loans are an increasing function of the interest rate on bonds. The larger
issue of loans produces a higher supply of deposits services, so the issue of loans is par-
tially self-ﬁnanced. The impact of the higher rate on the demand of deposits is negative,
so the reduction of the demand for deposits may often be larger than the increase of the
supply. In this case, the bank ﬁnances the increased issue of loans by switching away from
bonds. Bonds and loans are complementary assets, but the equilibrium quantity of bonds
is more volatile than the quantity of loans. The bank faces decreasing returns to scale
on loans, while returns to scale on bonds are constant; this implies that bonds holdings
largely represent a buffer, which is increased or reduced in function of the needs of the
issue of loans.
The ﬁnal effect on the interest rate on loans of an increase of the interest rate on bonds
depends on the market power of the bank. If the demand for loans is sensitive to the rate
on bonds and the market power of the bank relevant the rate on loans is an increasing
function of the rate on bonds. When competitive pressure is sufﬁciently strong though,
the relationship could even become negative, unless the coefﬁcient is a function of interest
rate too, d(rB), so that the demand for loans increases non-linearly with the interest rate
on bonds.
When the correlation between interest rates and default costs is relevant, higher inter-
est rates on bonds may imply higher rates even when the substitution between bonds and
loans is poor. Variations of interest rates produce a reduction of the borrower’s cash ﬂow
that is proportional to the initial level of the rate. So we can expect the effect of an interest
rate shock on default costs to be dependent on the initial level of the rates. In the case of
high initial levels of the interest rate, inﬂuence of the interest rate is likely to be largely
offset by the covariance of the default costs. Following the same line of reasoning, in the
case of heavy shocks we might expect that the effects are not symmetric in the case of
a positive or negative shock, and in particular that they depend on the initial level of the
interest rate.
31Introducing the distinction between small and large ﬁrms (deﬁning as small those
ﬁrms which do not have access to ﬁnancial markets and have to rely on banks for external
ﬁnance), it is possible to appreciate the beneﬁt that the bank’s risk insurance provides.
Banks in fact provide insurance not only to small ﬁrms which rely heavily on bank’s
lending as a source of ﬁnance. Banks provide insurance as well to all those borrowers,
such as large corporations, who can easily substitute bonds for loans. The reason is that
the spread between the rates is always reduced by a positive the shock, because the rate
on loans is sticky. And the viscosity of the rate on loans is a decreasing function of the
elasticity of the demand for loans. This explains why large ﬁrms, whose activities are
largely ﬁnanced issuing bonds, are always willing to pay fees to get access to the more
expensive, but more reliable, credit provided by banks.
4.2.2 Credit quality shocks
Different types of shocks of real origin affect borrowers, producing variations of cur-
rent and expected default costs.
To keep the analysis simple, we have assumed that expected default costs are the same
as the cost of the current period, and that expectations are revised when the current cost
changes. As a consequence, variations of the default cost coefﬁcient are caused by shocks
that are regarded as permanent ones by the banker.
Higher default costs reduce the size of the whole portfolio and increase the interest
rate on loans. In the case of a negative shock affecting permanently the average credit
quality of borrowers, our model predicts that banks reduce the issue of loans and raise
interest rates on loans.45 Accordingly, the bank would not provide insurance against this
kind of shocks.
The behaviour of the bank is likely to be different in the case of shocks which are
expected to be temporary. These types of shocks are likely to be smoothed, because both
the equilibrium quantity of loans and the equilibrium interest rate on loans are decreasing
but concave functions of default costs. Since any adjustment of the stock of deposits and
loans is costly, the impact of these shocks must be very small. Even in this case, though,
implicit contracts between the bank and its customers would never imply a reduction of
interest rates charged in reaction to the shock.
Even in the case of real shocks that produce a deterioration of credit quality, banks
may provide some sort of insurance against the shock. But in order to understand the
meaning of insurance in this context, we must extend the discussion beyond the strict
limits of the model and consider the impact of shocks on the available alternative external
sources of ﬁnance.
45This prediction is in line with the empirical ﬁndings of Berlin and Mester [2].
32In general, when heavy shocks hit the economy, it may become very difﬁcult for the
less informed lenders of the market to properly price certain risks, and the bond market
reacts abruptly to the shocks. In some cases the market may eventually altogether dry
out for some borrowers, because of the insurgence of a lemon problem. On the contrary,
in the case of banks, as long as their information allows the formulation of expectations
regarding future default costs, banks reduce the amounts involved in the provision of
direct lending facilities, but to a much a smaller degree than the bond market. In this sense
banks provide insurance even against this type of shocks. Besides, since some borrowers
are pushed to rely exclusively on banks, the demand for loans may surge as bonds are
not available any more to ﬁnance certain risky projects. A strong enough increase of the
demand could in principle push the bank to lend more, since the demand would in this
case grow more than proportionally as default costs rise. But in this case the correlation
between the demand for loans and default costs would probably be strong and the negative
impact of the covariance would be relevant. Consequently it seems unlikely that banks
may be willing to substitute the bond market to a large extent when large ﬁrms are hit by
credit quality shocks.
The extent to which banks may be willing to provide insurance when sharp variations
of relative prices produce idiosyncratic shocks, depends critically on the diversiﬁcation of
the portfolio. But even a bank with a perfectly diversiﬁed portfolio would not smooth en-
tirelytheseshocks. Thereasonisthataverageexpecteddefaultcostswouldalwayschange
after the shock. There is no way to allocate the quantity of lending to different classes of
lenders in order to obtain a perfect hedge, since not just the direction, but even the size of
the shocks is unpredictable. Besides many prices, as in the case of commodities or many
ﬁnancial products, are set in global markets, while on the contrary banking markets are
highly segmented and heavily regulated, limiting the possible diversiﬁcation of the port-
folio of loans. Since most banks operate in close national markets, it may useful in this
regard to distinguish between small and large ﬁrms lending. Banks specialised in small
ﬁrms lending or consumer credit can in fact achieve a larger diversiﬁcation of the portfo-
lio. Consequently, they can provide more insurance against credit quality shocks because
they can achieve both a lower average default costs, and a lower variance of defaults on
the portfolio of loans. 46
4.3 Credit rationing
According to the models of Stiglitz Weiss [37] and [38], credit rationing may occur
because asymmetric information causes adverse selection and moral hazard problems,
46Our model supports the empirical results of Berlin and Mester [2] and [3].
33producing a positive correlation between interest rates on loans and default costs. When
the correlation is so strong that higher interest rates generate a more than proportional
increase in default costs, reducing proﬁts, credit becomes rationed, because the supply
curve becomes backward-bending.
In our model the interest rate on loans is in normal conditions a monotonically in-
creasing function of the rate on bonds. So the correlation between interest rates on bonds
and default costs implies a similar correlation between interest rates on loans and default
costs. We have not speciﬁed the correlation coefﬁcient for the rate on loans, but because
of the structure of the solution, it must be lower than the coefﬁcient between bonds and
default costs. This is acceptable, since the asymmetry of information is less severe for the
bank than for the market. The situation described by Stiglitz and Weiss, of a reduction of
the equilibrium quantity of loans following a positive interest rate shock, would occur in






¶rB becomes negative, as from
Equation (52). When this is the case the interest rate on loans grows more with the rate
on bonds, and consequently the spread declines less as the rate on bonds goes up, as it is
evident from Equation (65). This implies that the stickiness of the rate on loans is not a
good test for the existence of credit rationing. The factors which produce credit rationing
make the rate on loans more sensitive to movements of the rate on bonds. Consequently
tests of credit rationing based on the behaviour of interest rates are inconclusive. This
result is in line with the evidence produced by Berger and Udell [1] suggesting that, in the
case of the market of the US, credit rationing is not a signiﬁcant phenomenon. They have
shown that commitment loans (insured against rationing) and normal loans do not behave
differently, and they have concluded that loan interest rates stickiness is caused by interest
rate smoothing.
5 Extension and limitations
The main limitations of the model is the absence of a proper analysis of the capital
structure of the bank. This limitation can only partially be addressed without making the
model much more complex.
5.1 Capital ratios
It can be useful to study the importance of the level of initial capital under the very
restrictive assumption of a strong equity rationing. In this case net worth has a very
modest inﬂuence on the problem, since the bank can generate liabilities issuing loans.
Consequently, itismainlyemployedinthepurchaseofbonds, andonlyaminorproportion
34d of the amount is used for the issue of loans.47 Besides, the bank does not need a buffer
because there is no penalty if proﬁts become negative during a period.
The relevance of net worth in this case is very limited. Yet this result is not trivial,
because since a higher capitalisation allows the bank to lend more creating liquidity, it
could be supposed that deposits should be positively correlated with net worth. On the
contrary, the model shows that a higher net worth increases only marginally issue of loans,
without any inﬂuence on the process of liquidity creation.
The model can easily be extended to analyse the impact of the legal requirement of
a minimum ratio between capital and loans. If the net worth of the bank has to cover at
least a ﬁxed proportion of the loans issued, since in our model the bank would never have
an incentive to keep a higher than necessary share of capital, we could assume that:
Lt +Ft +Rt = Dt +NWt, (68)
Rt = qDt, (69)
NWt = qLt. (70)
so that the budget constraint becomes the following:
(1−q)Lt = (1−q)Dt −Ft. (71)
It can be easily seen that in this case the results of the model would change in a simple
way. The term in net worth obviously disappears, and in the ﬁnal result both intercept
terms are multiplied for 1−q. The effect of this legal requirement is to reduce the for-
ward looking part of the solution. As a consequence in this case the size of the portfolio
is reduced in proportion to the legal requirement coefﬁcient, while the composition of the
assets portfolio is not affected. Clearly the amount of deposits is reduced as well, because
deposits positively depend on the main spread Zt. The impact of the imposition of cap-
italisation coefﬁcients is similar to the effect of reserve coefﬁcients on deposits, but it is
much stronger. This result explains why in order to control the growth of monetary ag-
gregates in periods of high inﬂation, the introduction of constraints on the issue of loans
is effective, while the increase of reserve coefﬁcient may not.
5.2 Remaining limitations
This model does not allow a correct assessment of the importance of the own capital
and of capital requirements, for two reasons. In ﬁrst instance the extreme volatility of
47This result does not depend on the lag structure adopted, because it can be shown that it remains
unchanged adopting a different structure for the lags of the feedback.
35deposits induced by bank runs is relevant for this kind of problems, and the introduction
of a stochastic error in the demand for deposits schedule could not solve the problem.48
Second, and even more important, the stock market has not been introduced in the anal-
ysis, and it is a relevant omission, because we are explicitly analysing conditions under
which the Modigliani-Miller theorem does not hold. The explicit introduction of the stock
market would be quite complex, since we should model agency problems in condition of
opaque information, and it is far beyond the scope of this work.
6 Conclusion
The equilibrium in the market for deposits has never been the object of dedicated stud-
ies, since it seems safe to assume that banks are always willing to supply any amount of
deposit services that the market requires. Banks have in fact mainly been studied in their
role of ﬁnancial intermediaries. But it has normally been neglected that banks can pay
deposits a low interest rate because they provide a whole range of payment services, and
the demand for deposits is largely a demand for the payment services that deposits allow.
The provision of payment services implies heavy costs, and the historical development
of different banking systems has been shaped by the evolution of the technology of the
transaction services industry. In this respect the banking industry is not different from any
other industry, as was pointed out by Fama, and industrial costs cannot be disregarded. As
a consequence, the equilibrium of the market for deposits must be properly micro-founded
on the basis of the proﬁt function of the banking ﬁrm.
Static portfolio models generate portfolio separability theorems, which imply that the
size of the bank does not depend on the composition of the portfolio of assets or liabil-
ities. Traditional portfolio models, though, do not take into account the crucial role that
the limited and costly availability of information plays in banking. Once we take into ac-
count the implications of the imperfect availability of information, a dynamic analysis is
required. Consequently portfolio separation theorems do not hold, and the composition of
both assets and liabilities has to be determined jointly with the optimal size of the banking
ﬁrm.
In this work we have provided a model of banking intermediation that explicitly ac-
counts for the links between assets and liabilities and where size and composition of the
portfolio are jointly determined. This allows a proper micro-foundation of the analysis of
the impact of banking intermediation on the transmission of different types of shock. Our
model shows that banks always smoothes the impact of shocks, both interest rates shocks
48Bank runs are in fact subject to radical uncertainty, since it is not possible to deﬁne a meaningful
probability distribution on these type of events.
36and credit quality shocks. Since banks need to maximise proﬁts over a long interval of
time because of the path dependence of their problem, and since variations of the quan-
tity of loans imply adjustment costs, the smoothing of shocks, minimising the variance of
the equilibrium quantities of the assets in the portfolio, produces higher proﬁts. Besides,
the model shows that banks provide further insurance against interest rate shocks to those
borrowers that have access to the bond market, reducing the spread between the rate on
loans and the rate on bonds when positive interest rate shocks occur. This because the
interest rate on loans is sticky, and holds as long as the bank has any market power.
Default costs reduce the optimal amount of any asset and liability of the portfolio and
are the main constraint on the size of the bank. This implies that regulatory requirements
regarding the write-off of bad loans are crucial not just for the efﬁciency of the banking
industry, but for the health of the economic system as a whole. When banks are allowed
to roll over loans that should be written off, the constraint on the size of the portfolio
is virtually removed, since default costs can be indeﬁnitely postponed. Any investment
could in this case be ﬁnanced, without any selection, producing permanent distortions in
the productive structure.
One of the peculiar results of the model is that banks that have a wide access to ﬁnan-
cial markets are normally induced to increase the issue of loans after a positive interest
rates shock. This result puts in question the relevance of the direct lending effect of the
credit channel. In accordance to the prediction of the model, the empirical support for the
direct lending effect comes almost exclusively from small banks, which have a limited
access to ﬁnancial markets. Another result relevant for monetary theory is that the supply
of deposits is an increasing function of interest rates on bonds. When portfolio separation
does not hold, in fact, the optimal supply of deposits depends on the return of the assets.
This implies that higher interest rates, raising the returns of assets, produce a larger sup-
ply of deposits. This supply side effect is normally neglected in monetary theory, but it
can explain the limited interest rate elasticity that empirical estimations of the demand for
money have found. Even the instability of monetary aggregates may largely be dependent
on the links between bank’s assets and liabilities, as central banks need in many circum-
stances to control the issue of loans in order to keep under control the growth of monetary
aggregates.
Finally we can observe that when banking institutions maximise proﬁts, their inter-
mediation is normally pro-cyclical since the size of the portfolio is an increasing function
of income. This seems to imply that banking intermediaries may generate a ﬁnancial
accelerator, whenever bank loans positively affect income.
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Appendix
Appendix: solution of the model with contemporaneous feedback





















































































































































To keep the notation simpler, we omit from now on the index j, to show it only when it
will be necessary, in the ﬁnal solutions. From Equation (73) we can obtain an equation













This value can be substituted in the other ﬁrst order condition, shown in equation (74),


































Rearranging and dividing everything by bt we obtain a difference equation for Ft and Dt.
Since Xt = Et[Xt] we can include everything under the expectation, from which we will
from now on omit the time index, since all expectations are at time t.
E
n























The next step is to simplify the resulting expression and to substitute for the value of Dt












































































































































































































Solution of the system
Deﬁning Xt = g3rD
t −g4rB
































































































































































































































































































The difference equation for deposits can be obtained with the same procedure.
Bonds















Xt+i+1 (where a and b are arbitrary
constant terms), applying the transversality condition of the problem, Equation (41) can
be solved as:































Since we have assumed that interest rates follow a random walk process, the correlation
between interest rates and default costs is time-invariant, and we can rewrite the expres-
45sion treating all future terms as constants:
































































































































The former expression can be exposed as:





















































































































Following the same steps, but substituting this time the value of Ft obtained form the





































































































































































































































The rational expectation equilibrium quantity of loans can be easily obtained from the
budget constraint L = (1−q)D−F +NW:
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¯ C1 = −
(1−d)k
(1−db)a




































The interest rate on loans
The interest rate on loans can easily be obtained substituting the solution (51) for the




49For simplicity we use the solution of (52), but the result is general.










+( ¯ A1+ ¯ A2L+ ¯ A3L2)rB















































+ ¯ A2L+ ¯ A3L2)rB






















































−( ¯ A2L+ ¯ A3L2)rB







































































































































> (1−q)k, d <
"
1−
s
(1−q)k(1−b)
1− d
b
#,
b. (117)
51